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Suffering in sport: why people willingly embrace negative emotional experiences 
 
Michael S. Brady 
 
 
The way our team plays is beside the point for most of us, just as winning cups and 
championships is beside the point. Few of us have chosen our clubs, they have simply 
been presented to us; and so as they slip from the Second Division to the Third, or sell 
their best players, or buy players who you know can’t play, or bash the ball for the 
seven hundredth time towards a nine foot centre-forward, we simply curse, go home, 
worry for a fortnight and then come back to suffer all over again. 
Fever Pitch, Nick Hornby 
 
Nearly everyone agrees that physical pain is bad. Indeed, if anything merits the status of 
a platitude in our everyday thinking about value, the idea that pain is bad surely does. 
Equally, it seems clearly true that emotional suffering – despair, loneliness, grief, 
disappointment, guilt, shame, lovesickness, and the like – are all bad as well. We are 
strongly inclined to pity and feel sorry for those who suffer emotionally in these ways; 
we are motivated, at least some of the time, to do what we can to alleviate their 
suffering. Given this, it might seem curious that pain and suffering are so integral to 
sport – whether one is a participant or a spectator. There’s nothing particularly puzzling 
about pain and suffering that is inadvertently related to sport – as when an athlete 
injures her hamstring and has to miss her chance at Olympic glory, or when supporters 
face the misery of getting up at 6am because an away game has been scheduled to start 
at noon. But there does seem to be something curious about the extent to which pain 
and suffering are voluntarily embraced by participants and spectators, as the quotation 
from Nick Hornby aptly illustrates. Why do people willingly engage in something that 
brings about so much suffering? In this paper I’ll attempt to answer this question.1  
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1. Preliminaries 
 
Since this is a paper about suffering, we should start by saying something about what 
suffering is. We can begin by saying that it is a particular state – roughly, the state of 
being in pain, misery, distress, unhappiness. And although there are uses of the term 
‘suffering’ to refer to damage or deterioration in general – as when we say that his 
reputation suffered after the critical mauling, or that the coastline is suffering from 
erosion – the term most naturally refers to the range of negative experiences. Suffering, 
on this view, is at heart an experiential state. It comes in a wide range of flavours. Thus 
we can distinguish physical suffering – which includes physical pain, but also highly 
unpleasant physical states of coldness, hunger, thirst, tiredness, nausea, irritation, etc. – 
and mental suffering, which includes, to quote David Hume, the emotional states of 
‘remorse, shame, anguish, rage, disappointment, anxiety, fear, dejection, despair’,2 and a 
wider range of highly unpleasant mental states including frustration, depression, 
spiritual pain, loneliness, stress, anxiety, social rejection, boredom, and homesickness. 
What do all of these states have in common? One plausible answer is that they all have 
an element or component of negative affect – they all feel bad or unpleasant, in other 
words. This is not to say that there is some one distinctive feel or quality that all such 
experiences have in common. That would be an extremely implausible claim to make. 
There is no particular feeling that a paper cut, depression, physical disgust, and dread 
have in common. There is, indeed, no particular feeling that all forms of physical pain 
have in common: a migraine and a stubbed toe and a bee sting are all rather different 
from the phenomenological standpoint. Nevertheless, we can still maintain that these 
states all feel unpleasant – in very different ways – and that when such states are of a 
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suitably high intensity, or are such that we strongly desire them to stop, then we suffer 
from them. That, very briefly, is what suffering is.3 
What then of the claim that suffering is integral to sport? Clearly the negative 
emotion of disappointment figures prominently in the life of most if not all sports fans; 
but other emotions are prominent as well. Prior to disappointment there is often 
excitement and expectation, but equally common – indeed probably more so, in the lives 
of dedicated fans – is the emotion of anxiety. Anger is a central part of the match-going 
experience for many spectators – football fans in the UK often spend a good proportion 
of their match-day experience in some form of rage or funk, whether directed towards 
their own team – and its badly-performing and overpaid players, inept management, 
and incompetent board – or the opposition players and fans. Boredom is often a central 
part of the sports’ fans life, as well as more refined negative emotions: a sense of 
helplessness and lack of meaning, feelings of listlessness and ennui, and so on. Forms of 
suffering are clearly central to sporting activity and participation as well. Here too the 
pains and suffering associated with injury and failure and disappointment loom large, 
the despair at missing out on the team or the race, the sense of futility when one loses 
yet again, the anger and frustration that is part and parcel of most rounds of golf.  
But there is another sense in which pain and suffering are bound up with 
participation in sports and more broadly active past-times. Consider the following 
actitivies: rugby, endurance running, boxing, mountain biking, martial arts, track 
cycling, ice hockey, lacrosse, wrestling, Australian Rules Football. What is striking about 
these sports and activities is that participants actively and voluntarily embrace the 
physical pain and emotional suffering that are usually at the heart of them. Think, if you 
want further illustrations, of the increasing popularity of endurance events like Tough 
Mudder, 12 miles of ‘extreme’ obstacle courses designed by Special Forces soldiers, or 
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similar events called things like Spartan Race and Total Warrior. The Independent notes 
that as of 2012, the industry worldwide was worth around $250 million.4 Or consider, 
to illustrate, the following from four-time Tour de France winner Chris Froome:  
 
Your body is saying, this hurts, that hurts, slow down – you just have to go faster. I’ve 
always loved that feeling of my body being on the limit. Feeling empty, having no more 
to give but still pushing your body. (Fordyce 2017) 
 
 
People who do Tough Mudder events, people like Froome and other Tour cyclists, rugby 
players and those who engage in MMA, welcome the pain and difficulty involved in their 
sports. If these things were easy, Froome and people like him simply wouldn’t do it. But 
that is plausibly true of all of the above examples. It is the physical contact, the prospect 
and reality of pain and suffering, the adversity, the difficulty, the challenge, that 
motivates those who participate in these sports. So although a lot of suffering associated 
with participation in sports is inadvertent and involuntary – think again of the injured 
athlete, or the maltreated football fan – very much of this is suffering that is wanted by 
participants. Indeed, it’s not just in sports that we find this voluntary embracing of 
suffering; think of how central difficulty and adversity is to mountain climbing, doing 
philosophy, playing chess, making art, creative writing, learning to play a musical 
instrument, caving, renovating a house, body building, religious devotion, exploring, 
game playing. Mountain climbers are not satisfied with gentle walks; explorers push 
themselves to extremes; musicians take on difficult and challenging pieces; game 
players aim at overcoming obstacles and exacting tests;5 the religious devotee wants a 
life of sacrifice, rather than a life of comfort and ease. Here too suffering is a condition 
on the value of activity. It is part of what the participant wants.6  
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How might we explain this relation between suffering and sport, a relation 
where the former isn’t a merely unwanted or inadvertent accompaniment to the latter? 
In the next section I’ll examine the idea that suffering is desired for certain instrumental 
reasons. On this view, suffering is wanted because it builds physical and psychological 
strength, or because it promises to enhance enjoyment and pleasure.7 I’ll argue that 
appealing to these values provides a good explanation of some cases, but there are other 
cases where this kind of explanation seems implausible. In §3, I’ll argue for a different 
account. On the view to be developed there, suffering in sport sometimes can play an 
important communicative role. In particular, it can signal to others that one possesses 
certain virtues, and as a result enhance one’s self-esteem and social standing. This 
suggests an evolutionary account of the pursuit of suffering: desires and motivations to 
engage in arduous and difficult activities (like the sports mentioned above) convey an 
adaptive advantage on those who possess them, and as a result have undergone positive 
selection.8  
 
2. The instrumental value of suffering in sport 
 
One response to our question is to maintain that suffering has instrumental value for 
participants and spectators. One form that this takes is in the provision of strength, 
since by suffering physically, our bodies can grow stronger. This is the principle behind 
muscle growth, which involves the damage and subsequent repair and strengthening of 
muscle fibres. Similarly, vaccination involves exposure to disease and temporary 
weakness, so that one becomes strong enough to resist it and healthier as a result. And 
the idea has obvious application when it comes to sporting participation. Athletes 
willingly embrace the pain and suffering of physical exercise in order to build muscles, 
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stamina, and endurance. Overcoming physical adversity has clear psychological benefits 
as well: one learns how to persevere, develops the psychological strength and fortitude 
to keep going when things are tough, becomes the kind of character that welcomes and 
embraces difficulties and challenges. Suffering has instrumental value from an 
epistemological standpoint too: through suffering, athletes can come to know the limits 
of their bodies; novice boxers learn that being hit doesn’t hurt as much as they feared it 
would; teams learn about, and from, disappointment and failure. As Sir Alex Ferguson, 
former Manchester United manager, put things: ‘You learn more from defeats than you 
do from victories.’ (It was no surprise to those who had followed Ferguson’s managerial 
career that after United lost the Premier League title on goal difference to Manchester 
City in 2012, they won the 2013 title by 11 points.)9 
When it comes to spectators and fans, suffering can also have clear instrumental 
value. Perhaps the main way in which this can happen is by enabling us to fully 
appreciate sporting values and achievements. One important set of such values are 
those that contrast with suffering. It might, for instance, be true that that we can only 
really understand or grasp the value of something if we have experience of its opposite: 
so we might only fully appreciate the goodness of a warm house and a full stomach if we 
have been cold, homeless, and hungry; we only fully appreciate love and companionship 
after we have experienced heartbreak and loneliness. The claim that suffering is 
necessary for such appreciation and understanding can itself be understood in two 
ways. On one reading, the claim is that the experience of certain pleasures requires the 
experience of suffering, since the pleasure itself can be defined simply in terms of relief 
from suffering. Think, for instance, of the relief one gets when one no longer suffers 
toothache, or when a neighbour’s loud music finally stops, or when one scratches that 
really irritating itch. As the psychologists Siri Leknes and Brock Bastian note: ‘The 
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contrast afforded by pain and other aversive experiences is closely associated with the 
subjective experience of relief’.10 And: ‘pain affords an effective contrast to many non-
painful experiences, which can appear relatively pleasant or rewarding if they occur 
after the pain has ended. For instance, fruit flies approached odours associated with 
pain offset even when these odours were initially mildly aversive … Similar effects have 
been observed in rats … and humans’.11 Some of these humans will be sports fans. 
Think, for instance, of the relief that Cleveland Browns fans felt recently after their team 
won for the first time in 635 days, after having endured two seasons of misery, 
frustration, disappointment, and humiliation. 
On a second reading, the claim is that a prior experience of suffering intensifies 
our experience of some value, so that the latter is experienced as more pleasant as a 
result. The pleasure of cold beer is heightened and intensified if one is thirsty and 
overheated on a blistering day. Here are Leknes and Bastian again: ‘Although 
introspection suggests to many people that relief and pleasure are easily dissociated, 
most primary rewards are intensified by relief. Food and drink taste better when 
providing relief from hunger or thirst … And where would the pleasure in going to bed 
at night be if we were not so tired, our muscles weary and aching?’12 This too has 
obvious parallels for sporting fans. The pleasure that Boston Red Sox fans experienced 
when their team won the baseball World Series in 2004 was surely intensified by the 
fact that the team hadn’t won it since 1918; many Red Sox fans had known nothing but 
despair and disappointment for their lifetime following the team. (The run of near-
misses in that time is so notable that some thought, not entirely in jest, that the club was 
‘cursed’ after trading Babe Ruth to the New York Yankees in 1919.) Here too suffering 
would seem to have clear instrumental value for spectators and fans.  
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However, these (and other) forms of instrumental goodness do not exhaust the 
value that suffering can have for players and spectators of sport. This is because many 
of the instances described in the previous section – where people voluntarily engage in 
sporting activities that involve pain and suffering – are not cases where people do so to 
make themselves stronger or fitter, or because their pleasure will thereby be intensified 
or enhanced. It is implausible to suppose that endurance runners and boxers and 
golfers and cyclists and hockey players embrace challenges and difficulties, and the pain 
and suffering that are part and parcel of these, only because these are a way to get fitter 
and stronger, physically and psychologically. Nor is it the case that those who engage in 
these sporting activities always do so because of the pleasures of relief when the 
suffering stops, or because the suffering promises to make the good times even better. 
While there is such a thing as runner’s high, and intense pleasure in hitting a five-iron 
perfectly after a run of poor shots, endurance runners and golfers don’t embrace 
challenge and difficulty for these hedonistic reasons alone either. This is because 
runners and golfers would still embrace difficulty and suffering even if it didn’t have 
these hedonistic benefits. In other words: it is not the case that participants only 
embrace pain and suffering because this will improve their skills and performance, 
and/or because it promises to make the good times better – although it is doubtless true 
that pain suffering will have these positive effects in many cases. Instead, those who 
play and participate in sports often seem to regard suffering as a condition on the value 
of what they do; they think that suffering partly defines the value of their activity, in 
much the same way that difficulty is a condition on the attraction of philosophical 
puzzles or video games, and sacrifice a condition on the worth of religious devotion and 
musical performance. These attitudes don’t seem to be explicable in terms of obvious 
instrumental benefits like increased strength or intensified pleasure.  
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A similar point can be made about the motivations of fans and spectators. 
Football supporters, say, clearly put up with all kinds of pain and suffering – related to 
the weather, cost of tickets, poor transport, terrible grounds, risible treatment by 
authorities, the contempt of other fans, the indifference of their own players, etc. – for 
the sake of their team. They also doubtless sometimes think that bad times enhance the 
good in the ways explained earlier. But these are not the only motivations that fans have 
to endure and embrace suffering. Instead, suffering is sometimes viewed as part of what 
it is to be a fan. Here again suffering is embraced as a condition on the value of being a 
supporter. If things were too easy, comfortable, organized, and fun; if one’s team were 
too successful, the opposing fans too respectful, the media and authorities too 
supportive; then I suspect that many supporters would lose interest in their team. It’s 
not that pain and suffering are therefore the price one pays for being a fan, or that they 
make the occasional good times even better – although again, these things are clearly 
true a lot of the time. Instead, pain and suffering are part of what being a fan or 
supporter is all about. In the following section I’ll try to make sense of these cases 
where participants and fans willingly embrace pain and suffering.  
 
3. Suffering and the communication of virtue 
 
I said above that people often pursue activities that involve pain and suffering because 
they view this as a condition on the worth of those activities. This isn’t aberrant or 
masochistic behaviour, however. Instead, there are good reasons for such pursuit, 
which has considerable value both in terms of the happiness of the agent in question, 
and for the well-being of others. This is because (successfully) engaging in difficult and 
arduous activity plays a communicative role: in particular, it communicates to others 
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than one possesses certain virtues, leading to enhanced self-esteem and the opportunity 
for valuable co-operation. Since both of these have adaptive value, then we can tell a 
plausible evolutionary story of the intentional pursuit of suffering in sport, grounded in 
its communicative value and the enhanced benefits for the individual that accrue as a 
result of this. In a sense, the resulting picture still appeals to the instrumental or 
extrinsic benefits of such pursuit; but it isn’t an explanation that appeals in the main to 
an individual’s reasons or motives for doing what they do. So it is no part of the story 
that participants and fans need to consciously think in terms of the communicative 
value of their own suffering, and the enhanced self-esteem that this might bring –
although it is clearly possible that some participants and fans do have such value in 
mind. Nevertheless, the evolutionary story strikes me as a plausible explanation of our 
willingness to embrace and welcome suffering, whether in sport or elsewhere, since it 
posits that this willingness has been selected for. Or so, at least, I’ll argue.  
To see the communicative value that suffering can have, we need to look more 
closely at a positive emotion which is related to sporting success and achievement, 
namely pride. The emotion of pride can be characterized in terms of a certain ‘appraisal 
structure’: roughly, it involves an appraisal or assessment of an object or event as (i) 
valuable, and (ii) as related in some way to oneself. Gabriele Taylor has a more precise 
definition of the emotion in her 1985 book Pride, Shame, and Guilt.13 She writes: 
[A] person who experiences pride believes that she stands in the relation of 
belonging to some object (person, deed, state) which she thinks desirable in 
some respect … It is because (in her view) this relation holds between her and 
the desirable object that she believes her worth to be increased, in the relevant 
respect. This belief is constitutive of the feeling of pride. (Taylor 1985: 41)  
 
On Taylor’s view, we feel pride in some object or event that we think is valuable or 
desirable, and that stands in some relation of ‘belonging’ to us. Taylor continues: ‘It is in 
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virtue of belonging to the same family, the same country or institution that people are 
proud of their ancestors, countrymen, or colleagues’ (ibid). But the proud person must 
also regard her standing in this relation as something that is itself valuable, as reflecting 
well on her, and as a source of self-worth or self-esteem. So we are not necessarily 
proud when we are related to something that is valuable; I might not be proud of my 
family’s fancy yacht, for example, because I think this a source of shame, given the levels 
of poverty in the world. Instead, I must take the relation to be one that enhances my 
worth and social standing. Pride is thus a positive emotion that involves a particular 
appraisal of the relationship between the proud person, and some object or event that 
they take to enhance their standing and esteem. 
This is what pride is. But what does pride do? What is its function or purpose? To 
answer these questions, I want to consider an evolutionary account of pride that has 
emerged from recent work in social psychology, which stresses its communicative 
value. This is the account of pride developed in a paper from 2010 by Jessica Tracy, 
Azim Shariff, and Joey Cheng.14 On their account, ‘pride is a psychologically important 
and evolutionarily adaptive emotion’ that has ‘evolved to serve specifically social 
functions’ (164). Evidence for this view comes from work on the facial expression of 
pride, and in particular from the fact that ‘its expression is displayed by individuals 
across cultures in the same contexts and situations’ (168). Consider, in support, ‘recent 
studies assessing behavioral responses to success at the Olympic and Paralympics 
Games, showing that sighted and blind athletes spontaneously display the pride 
expression in response to Olympic victory’ (168). Since this cannot be learned 
behaviour, at least not in congenitally blind athletes, the expressions would seem to be 
biologically innate. Tracy et al. argue that expression of pride has evolved to serve a 
particular function that is related to the circumstances in which it occurs. These are 
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circumstances where the subject (or those close to her) has been successful, or has 
achieved something. The authors suggest that pride has evolved ‘to serve the distal 
function of enhancing social status’. In particular, pride has evolved ‘to help individuals 
transform culturally valued achievements into higher social status’ (168). Feelings of 
pride, and their facial and bodily expression, therefore have the function of advertising 
and communicating one’s achievements to others, and as a result of enhancing one’s 
status and esteem. Feelings of pride do this in a number of ways, but two are of 
particular importance. 
First, feelings of pride ‘[motivate] individuals to strive for achievements in 
socially valued domains’ (168). For the subject, pride is usually experienced as a 
positive emotion or has positive valence, and it is plausible to explain positive valence in 
terms of pleasure. Thus joy, feelings of friendship and love, aesthetic appreciation, and 
pride are all positive emotions in virtue of being pleasurable experiences. Now pleasure 
is a positive reinforcer, and so pleasurable experiences typically motivate the subject to 
seek out more of that which generates pleasure. In the case of pride, we are taught – by 
parents, teachers, and peers – to feel pride in relation to certain socially valued objects 
and events. As a result, we are taught to feel good about ourselves when we have a 
positive relation towards such goods. So as children we are praised, and feel good about 
ourselves, when we excel in school, show kindness to others, respect our teachers, stand 
up to bullies, do well in sport, and so on. As a result, a child will come to see herself as 
able, independent, talented, and strong, but also a valued member of the school, 
community, and country. Since pleasure is reinforcing, the child will ‘strive to develop 
an identity that coheres with social norms’ (168), and will as a result be motivated more 
strongly to behave in ways which promote such norms and identities. Insofar as she is 
successful, she will garner further praise and esteem from others, and be ‘rewarded 
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with social approval, acceptance, and increased social status, all of which promote 
adaptive fitness’ (168). On this view, therefore, pride is a force that motivates the 
pursuit of socially approved goods. Not only will these goods typically benefit the 
person directly – as when she passes the exam or is promoted at work – but also benefit 
her indirectly, via reputational rewards for success and achievement in these areas. 
Second, the facial and bodily expression of pride can enhance our reputation and 
social status. Tracy et al. note that pride enhances status through ‘its universally 
recognized nonverbal expression, which may function to inform observers (other social 
group members) of the proud individual’s achievement, indicating that he/she deserves 
higher status’ (169). The authors support this with their own research: ‘Using the 
Implicit Association Test … we found that the pride expression is rapidly and 
automatically perceived as a signal of high status’ (ibid). Such signals can be of value to 
the subject displaying pride, and thus who is perceived to be of high status as a result, 
since they then ‘receive increased resources, attention, and other status-related 
benefits’ (ibid). Such signalling and display can also benefit observers, and in two ways. 
First, those who observe the subject as having higher status can then ‘more 
effectively navigate the status hierarchy by showing appropriate deference, knowing 
whom to emulate, forming productive alliances, and facilitating their own status 
jockeying’ (169–170). Second, such signals and displays can communicate that the 
subject possesses certain positive qualities or virtues, knowledge of which can benefit 
the group as a whole. (As with other emotional expressions, this isn’t always the case. 
There is room for deception and misinterpretation here, as elsewhere.) We have already 
seen the close connection between pride and achievement: pride is properly felt with 
respect to valuable objects or events that in some sense belong to the subject. Typically, 
they are things that the subject is responsible for, and result from the subject’s agency. 
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(This is why we can distinguish genuine cases of pride, from cases where someone is 
merely ‘basking in reflected glory’, where the object of this latter attitude lacks the right 
kind of relationship and responsibility.) But knowledge that someone is responsible for 
some achievement or accomplishment is equally knowledge that they possess the 
relevant skills and virtues required to bring that thing about. Many if not most socially 
valued goods require the development and exercise of skills and qualities such as 
courage, talent, hard work, dexterity, and fortitude. As a result, facial and bodily 
expressions of pride communicate that a person possesses these valuable features and 
qualities, and stands to be of considerable benefit to particular others – who can engage 
in mutually beneficial cooperative activity with the virtuous person – and to the group 
as a whole. Knowing who is skilled and virtuous has significant value, especially in 
small-scale groups, since it can ground efficient utilization of such things, and effective 
decision-making about who ought to be assigned or asked to perform which tasks. 
This evolutionary account of the way in which emotions such as pride facilitate 
higher social standing, and at the same time communicate information that can be of 
great value to the group, can in my view help us to explain why both participants and 
supporters regard pain and suffering as a condition on the value of what they do. For 
the successful pursuit of difficult and arduous activities can signal to observers that one 
possesses a range of important virtues, which can enhance self-esteem, social standing, 
and facilitate co-operative behaviour. Such traits can therefore have adaptive value.  
Consider first participation in difficult or arduous sports: boxing and endurance 
cycling and rugby and mixed martial arts and the like. A plausible (evolutionary) 
explanation of such activity mirrors the one we told for pride. Suppose that something 
strikes us as difficult or challenging or arduous – the endurance race, the MMA 
competition – and we are directly motivated by the aim of rising to the challenge. An 
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explanation of how we stand to benefit from achieving the relevant goal appeals to the 
reputational rewards involved. For given that social norms reward achievement, and 
given that what counts as achievement typically tracks what is difficult and challenging, 
and given that what is difficult and challenging typically requires the exercise of virtues 
such as strength, fortitude, courage, patience, and perseverance, it is not surprising that 
some people will be strongly motivated to engage in difficult and challenging activities 
in general, and hence motivated to engage in these particular instances of the difficult 
and the challenging. For participation in, and especially success in, activities like these 
both brings about socially-valued goods, and advertises to others that one possesses 
valued qualities and traits. In the case of difficult or challenging sports, physical and 
psychological strength and fortitude will be prominent. These will in turn garner praise 
and esteem from others, and enhance one’s social standing, which – as Tracy and 
colleagues argue – promotes adaptive fitness. Participation in, and especially success in, 
sports that require one to face up to and overcome suffering and adversity therefore has 
adaptive value, both in terms of the value of what is achieved, but also in terms of 
enhanced reputation and improved social status. This provides us with a neat 
explanation as to why for some people, difficult and adversity – and the pain and 
suffering that are at the heart of these – are a condition on the value of sporting 
activity.15  
Participation in such sports promises to have social benefits as well, which can 
further redound on participants. Once again, social knowledge of who has a particular 
range of virtues – such as strength, courage, patience, and perseverance – is likely to 
benefit the group as a whole. Such people can be relied upon to perform important 
group-related tasks that call for the exercise of these virtues. Knowing who is patient 
increases the chances of hiring a good teacher or a counsellor or a negotiator; knowing 
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who is courageous puts us in a better position to elect leaders and managers who won’t 
crumble under pressure. By the same token, knowledge that certain people participate 
and excel in arduous and testing sports – and hence knowledge of who is strong, and 
who will persevere in the face of adversity – can be of significant practical value to the 
group in general. For such people are more likely to be reliable in a great variety of 
difficult and challenging circumstances, and to elicit admiration and trust from others. 
Knowing who we can rely upon, who we can trust, is of significant value for the group as 
a whole; and insofar as the group as whole is better off as a result of knowledge of 
virtue, then the virtuous person themselves is likely to be better off as well. (Of course, 
sporting courage, perseverance, and fortitude are not always indicative of reliability and 
trustworthiness – as Lance Armstrong amply illustrates. Still, it’s not implausible to 
think that in general it’s good to know who is strong and courageous and patient.)  
What, though, of the fact that pain and suffering are also often central to the life 
of the sports fan or supporter, and not simply because this is the price that one must 
unwillingly pay to be a fan, nor because experiencing suffering makes the occasional 
joys of victory so much sweeter. Can we explain this fact on similar lines?   
I think that we can. At the end of the previous section I said that pain and suffering are 
part of what it is to be a fan. This was meant to capture the idea that it’s not just 
participants in arduous or challenging sports that have pain and suffering as a condition 
on the value of what they do. But the claim that pain and suffering are part of what it is 
to be a fan isn’t quite right, however. For there are, of course, fair-weather fans: the 
glory-hunters, the johnny-come-latelys, who think of sport as a kind of entertainment, 
who are attracted to the pleasures and excitement of investing themselves in some team 
or club or sporting personality, but who are quick to jettison the object of their fleeting 
affection when things go awry. (The Fast Show’s Roger Nouveau is a fine illustration of 
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the type, being an Arsenal fan who previously supported Manchester United, and then 
before that Blackburn Rovers…) It is therefore more accurate to say that pain and 
suffering are part of what it is to be a loyal, true, authentic, proper fan. It is not that pain 
and suffering are the objects or aims of fans or supporters; instead, such things are once 
again a condition of support for one’s team or club, something without which one’s 
attachment lacks the right kind of authenticity and value.  
Given this, we can tell a similar story about why pain and suffering are bound up 
in the lives of genuine fans and supporters. For by suffering for one’s team, one thereby 
communicates that one has a range of important virtues, where such communication 
bolsters one’s social standing and self-esteem, and at the same time has benefits for the 
group as a whole. Perhaps the most important virtue that embracing suffering for the 
sake of one’s team demonstrates is loyalty: one sticks with the team through thick and 
(many more times) thin, because that is what a genuine supporter does. And the more 
loyal a fan is perceived to be – the more he or she sacrifices for the sake of the team – 
the higher their social standing in the set of supporters, and the greater the attendant 
benefits of this standing, including increased resources and attention. By the same 
token, other supporters benefit from the communication of virtues of loyalty and 
authenticity that suffering for a team provides, since they can then ‘more effectively 
navigate the status hierarchy by showing appropriate deference, knowing whom to 
emulate, forming productive alliances, and facilitating their own status jockeying’ 
(Tracy et al., 169-70). Embracing and expressing suffering for the sake of one’s team 
thus promises to benefit other supporters as well – who in turn might reciprocate by 
bestowing further esteem and benefits on those who are loyal and authentic. So we can 
tell a similar story as to why fans and supporters willingly embrace pain and suffering 
as a condition on the worth of what they do.  
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At this point someone might object that the idea of a proper fan is a very recent 
phenomenon, and so there is reason to be sceptical about any claims of adaptive value 
here. But as with the case of participation in sports – many of which are, like MMA and 
endurance cycling, also very new – this misses the point. For the idea that through 
suffering we can communicate loyalty and trustworthiness and other virtues to some 
group is not recent at all, and suffering for the sake of one’s team is simply a modern 
instance of this general phenomenon. Consider, to support, the phenomenon of 
initiation rites and ceremonies, which are found in very many cultures across very 
many historical periods. One of the central points of such rites and ceremonies is to test 
the initiands, usually in a way that involves the imposition of suffering, in the form of 
physical pain, but also psychological trials and humiliations. The initiand’s acceptance of 
and endurance of suffering communicates to the group that they have a range of 
important virtues – courage, fortitude, perseverance, but also loyalty, commitment, and 
humility.16 Those who endure and successfully pass the test gain significant rewards – 
in terms of enhanced self-esteem, social standing, and the like. At the same time, the 
group as a whole benefits, through knowing that the initiand has virtues which can be 
put to good use, but also through knowing that the initiands is loyal to and committed to 
the group as a whole. Initiation rites and ceremonies therefore bolster group identify 
and solidarity. It seems to me that suffering for the sake of one’s team is simply a 
modern instance of this phenomenon, whereby one suffers for the sake of some group 
or collective and in so doing communicates to others that one has certain virtues. Such 
communication will, in turn, stand to benefit both the individual who suffers, and her 
collective. She will enjoy enhanced social standing and esteem; they will know that she 
is a true fan, and someone whose presence bolsters group identity and solidarity. 
Although the idea of a proper fan is a modern phenomenon, it fits a practice of 
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communicating virtue through enduring suffering that is long-standing and cross-
cultural. Being motivated to endure suffering for the sake of one’s membership in some 
group, and for the sake of the group itself, is something that might very well have 
adaptive value, and so an evolutionary account of this isn’t implausible.     
 
4. Conclusion 
 
Why do people willingly participate in and watch sports that bring pain and suffering? 
Sometimes suffering is an unwelcome price to pay for being a player or a fan. 
Sometimes suffering has important instrumental values – it promotes strength, it 
enhances pleasure. But I’ve argued that there is another explanation of why we are 
motivated to embrace pain and suffering in sport: by doing so, we communicate our 
virtue to others, which has significant adaptive value. Those who suffer for the sake of 
their sport or for their team can therefore enjoy enhanced self-esteem and social 
standing. It might not seem like this most of the time, but perhaps this is one of the main 
reasons that we come back to suffer again and again.  
 
University of Glasgow 
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Notes 
 
                                                     
1 The fact that people willingly embrace pain and suffering in sport is also the topic of an 
excellent paper by Jeffrey Fry (Fry 2006). Some of Fry’s suggested explanations will be 
discussed later, although space prevents me from considering all of the interesting things he 
says in his paper.  
2 Hume, D. (1779), Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, Part 10, p. 42 in the version by 
Jonathan Bennett presented at www.earlymoderntexts.com.  
3 For much more detail on this, see my book Suffering and Virtue (2018), Oxford University 
Press, especially Ch. 1.  
4 http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/tough-mudder-the-obstacle-courses-
for-adults-that-are-now-worth-250m-8603427.html 
5 Some hold that this is part of the definition of game playing. Thus Bernard Suits write: “Playing 
a game is the voluntary attempt to overcome unnecessary obstacles.” In Suits, B. (2005), The 
Grasshopper: Games, Life and Utopia, Orchard Park, NY: Broadview, p. 55. Thanks to Nathan 
Wildman for the suggestion and the reference.  
6 To say that suffering is a condition on the value of the activity for a subject is compatible with 
the activity having intrinsic and independent value. My thought is that without suffering, the 
activity wouldn’t have (as much) value for the subject herself. It is, after all, perfectly possible 
for us to recognize that something is valuable – such as free jazz or gardening or ballroom 
dancing – without such things being (of much) value to us, since we don’t care about or for such 
things. On my view, suffering plays the same role as a condition of value as caring does.   
7 These are not the only possibilities. Fry notes (2006, p. 251), drawing from parallels with 
religious experience, that athletes sometimes embrace pain and suffering because it promises to 
enhance personal well-being and be a part of ‘soul making’. Space prohibits me from addressing 
these very interesting options. But even if such explanations capture some cases, the idea that 
embracing pain and suffering has significant communicative value arguably captures more, and 
so constitues an explanation that has wider scope. Or so, at least, I’m inclined to think.  
8 A weaker claim is that such advantages are mere side effects of something that does have 
adaptive value. This is not the time to engage in an argument for the stronger claim, and so I’m 
happy to admit that the evoluationary account is at this stage simply a suggestion. Thanks to a 
referee for this paper for pushing me to clarify this.  
9 See also Fry (2006), p. 251, who quotes Lance Armstrong on the epistemic and revelatory 
value of suffering.  
10 Leknes S. & Bastian, B. (2014), ‘The Benefits of Pain’, Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5, p. 
65. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid.  
13 Taylor, G. (1985), Price, Shame, and Guilt: Emotions of Self-Assessment, New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
14 Tracy, J., Shariff, A. & Cheng, J. (2010), ‘A Naturalist’s View of Pride’, Emotion Review 2(2): 
163–177. 
15 I’m not claiming, of course, that participation in specific sporting activities like endurance 
cycling and MMA has been selected for. Instead, the claim is that a motivation to engage in 
painful and arduous activity has significant adaptive value, and that has plausibly been selected 
for. Endurance cycling and MMA are very recent forms of painful and arduous activity, and so 
that’s why the evolutionary story is appropriate here.  
16 For a fascinating take on such ceremonies, see Jean La Fontaine’s Initiation, Penguin Books, 
1985. 
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